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BASHOR/NUNN AGREEMENTS: CAN AN INSURER
INTERVENE IN A LAWSUIT BETWEEN A PLAINTIFF AND
INSURED DEFENDANT UNDER COLORADO LAW?
NATHAN A. SCHACHT†
Snaking through the courts of many jurisdictions are important under-the-radar lawsuits, the outcomes of which are critically important to
insurers. Imagine this: you are an insurer and one of your insured is involved in an accident in which a third-party is injured. The third-party
sues the insured for injuries resulting from the accident. However, you,
the insurer, are not a party to the lawsuit. During pre-trial settlement negotiations, the third-party and the insured enter into a private agreement
that you are excluded from. The agreement assigns all of the insured’s
rights and interest in any claim for insurance the insured may have
against the insurer to the third-party. In exchange for this, the third-party
agrees to not execute or attempt to enforce any judgment against the insured. Moreover, the third-party and insured agree to a quick liability
and damage determination, if it is not stipulated to in the agreement, before a court or arbitrator. The third-party and insured carry out this determination without your involvement. The third-party then pursues its
claim against you in a separate bad faith lawsuit. You had no participation in the underlying lawsuit, but are nevertheless thus stuck fighting
against the stigma of the liability and/or damages determination from the
previous suit in the subsequent bad faith action.
Needless to say, this is not a position in which insurers like to find
themselves, but this is happening across multiple jurisdictions, including
the State of Colorado. This article explores the legal background of these
agreements and argues that, though this is an issue of first impression in
Colorado, insurers likely meet all Rule 24 intervention requirements and
should be allowed to intervene in underlying tort actions in order to promote public policy goals such as fairness and judicial economy.
BASHOR/NUNN AGREEMENTS
The Colorado Supreme Court first expressly permitted agreements
between insureds and third-parties in the decision Northland Insurance
Co. v. Bashor.1 In Bashor, a third-party sued an insured and obtained a
judgment in excess of the insured’s liability policy limits.2 Subsequently,
† Nathan A. Schacht is an attorney in Baker & Hostetler LLP’s Denver office whose practice focuses on litigation and employment law.
1. 494 P.2d 1292 (Colo. 1972).
2. Id. at 1293.
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the insured and third-party executed an agreement in which the insured
agreed to: (1) pay a portion of the judgment; (2) pursue the remainder
against the insurer through a bad faith claim for breach of the duty to
settle; and (3) pay any judgment obtained in the bad faith litigation to the
third-party.3 In exchange, the third-party agreed to not collect on the
judgment against the insured.4 After the insurer challenged the insured
and third-party’s agreement, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
agreement was valid.5 Thus, the Bashor decision permits an insured and
third-party to enter into a post-trial agreement involving a covenant not
to execute on a judgment that has been determined by a neutral factfinder.
The Colorado Supreme Court reinforced this ruling by finding a
similar type of agreement valid in Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Ross.6
In Old Republic, the insureds and third-parties entered into an agreement
related to a lawsuit for injuries resulting from an airplane accident.7 In
the agreement, the insureds consented to a stipulated judgment against
them for over $5 million and the third-parties agreed to not collect on
that stipulated judgment.8 In return, the insureds agreed to pursue bad
faith claims against their insurer so as to satisfy the stipulated judgment.9
In response, the insurer challenged the stipulated judgment claiming that
it was not enforceable.10 The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the
stipulated judgment was not binding on the insurer in the subsequent bad
faith litigation unless bad faith was found, in which case the stipulated
judgment could be enforceable.11 Although the Supreme Court emphasized that the insurer must be found liable for bad faith in order for the
stipulated judgment to be enforceable, the Court expressly declined to
hold that all pretrial stipulated judgments are per se unenforceable,12
leaving insurers financially exposed to pre-trial agreements in which they
were not included.
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court further clarified the scope and
enforceability of these agreements and stipulated judgments in Nunn v.
Mid-Century Insurance Co.13 In Nunn, a third-party sued the insured for
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident.14 Before trial, the
insured and third-party entered into a settlement agreement in which the
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insured agreed to pay $100,000, his insurance policy limit, to the thirdparty and also stipulated to an additional judgment totaling $4,000,000.15
The insured further agreed to assign his bad faith claims against the insurer to the third-party.16 The third-party agreed not to execute on the
stipulated judgment.17 Subsequently, the third-party brought a bad faith
action against the insurer for failure to accept a reasonable settlement
offer.18 The insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the third-party did not have actual damages despite the stipulated
judgment and the covenant not to execute.19 On appeal, the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts and concluded that the
stipulated judgment could in fact serve as proof of actual damages.20 The
Court explained that the stipulated judgment was not automatically binding on the insurer and that it would have an opportunity to defend the
reasonableness of its settlement decisions in the subsequent bad faith
action.21 Consequently, in the bad faith action, the third-party was required to prove not only that the insurer acted in bad faith, but also that
the stipulated judgment was “a reasonable reflection of the worth of [the
third-party’s] injury claims against [the insured], and thus the proper
measure of damages for [the third-party’s] bad faith claim against [the
insurer].”22 “As such, the particular amount of the stipulated judgment
merely serves as evidence of the value of Nunn’s claims as bargained for
and does not represent the presumptive value of the actual damages in
the bad faith case.”23
These cases illustrate the Colorado Supreme Court’s affirmation of
the validity of these types of agreements between insureds and thirdparties, to the detriment of insurers. These agreements, which can result
in stipulated judgments without any neutral fact-finder adjudicating the
claims or judgment amount, can serve as evidence in subsequent bad
faith proceedings against the insurer. With juries already predisposed to
a general distrust of insurance companies, these stipulated judgments
potentially have a significant prejudicial effect on insurers in bad faith
litigation, litigation in which insurers are already accused of acting unreasonably. So, how does an insurer attempt to protect itself in these
situations? Currently, the most feasible way for an insurer to protect
itself in these situations is by intervening in the underlying tort action
between the insured and the third-party.
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RULE 24 AND THE ABILITY TO INTERVENE
A party may intervene as a matter of right if: (1) the applicant
claims an interest in the subject matter of the litigation; (2) the disposition of the case may impede or impair the applicant’s ability to protect
that interest; and (3) the interest is not adequately represented by existing
parties.24
The first prong of this test “is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with efficiency and due process.”25 The second “impairment”
prong questions whether there is a clear alternative venue in which the
proposed intervener may pursue relief.26 Once an intervener can point to
an “interest relating to the transaction” that is the basis of the ongoing
lawsuit, the intervening party should be allowed to participate if it appears that all of its interests may not otherwise be adequately represented
by those already parties to that lawsuit.27
Although no published decision from a Colorado court has opined
on an insurer’s ability to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in this context,
other states have allowed such intervention. This article argues that the
circumstances underlying Bashor/Nunn agreements as well as the interests of, and potential prejudice to, an insurer in such context leans in
favor of permitting intervention.
CASE LAW CONCERNING AN INSURER’S ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THE
BASHOR/NUNN CONTEXT
In states that have recognized agreements like Colorado’s Bashor/Nunn agreements, insurers are permitted to intervene in an underlying tort suit where the damages component of the insurer’s potential liability for later bad faith claims is being litigated.28
The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in H.B.H. v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company is instructive and persuasive on an insurer’s ability to intervene.29 In H.B.H., the third-party and insured entered into a
24. COLO. R. CIV. P. 24(a); Feigin v. Alexa Grp., Ltd., 19 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. 2001).
25. Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist., 266 P.3d 401, 404 (Colo. 2011)
(quotations and citations omitted).
26. See Mauro by & through Mauro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12CA1509, 2013
WL 3943247, at *3 (Colo. App. Aug. 1, 2013).
27. See, e.g., O'Hara Grp. Denver, Ltd. v. Marcor Hous. Sys., Inc., 595 P.2d 679, 688 (Colo.
1979) (en banc).
28. See, e.g., Himes v. Safeway Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 74, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (insurer permitted to intervene of right prior to entry of stipulated judgment); Purvis v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
877 P.2d 827, 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (insurer properly intervened of right where insured did not
tender defense to insurer and insurer became aware of suit after insured was already represented by
counsel); Anderson v. Martinez, 762 P.2d 645, 648 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (insurer permitted to
intervene of right because it would generally be bound in a later suit by injured party by collateral
estoppel effect of determination of insured’s liability and plaintiff’s damages in underlying case).
29. 823 P.2d 1332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
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“Damron” agreement, which is comparable to a Bashor/Nunn Agreement.30 In the agreement, the third-party agreed to limit the insured’s
personal liability and collect the remainder of any judgment in the underlying litigation from the insurer.31 Prior to a hearing on damages, the
insurer moved to intervene pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a), which was denied.32 In holding that the insurer had a right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a) for the purpose of contesting the reasonableness of any damages award, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed multiple Arizona decisions allowing insurers to intervene including Anderson
v. Martinez.33 The court concluded that because a hearing on damages
would be completely one-sided in favor of the plaintiff due to the Damron agreement, and because the insurer had a right to question the reasonableness of the agreement, the most appropriate time for the insurer to
intervene was during the underlying litigation.34
Though intervention in this context is still a matter of first impression in Colorado, it is likely that insurers would be able to successfully
intervene in an insured and third party’s tort lawsuit in order to properly
protect their interests. To start, an insurer can argue that it should be
permitted to intervene as a matter of right because it has a real and direct
interest in the subject matter of the underlying case because the amount
of judgment issued in that case can be used as evidence against it in a
subsequent bad faith action. Further, by entering into the Bashor/Nunn
Agreement, the insured defendant abrogates any real interest in defending against liability and damage claims. Thus, as a practical matter, an
insurer is not be protected by either party in the underlying tort litigation.
These concerns are particularly important where the parties simply stipulate to a judgment or agree to submit the underlying tort claim to an alternative dispute resolution process, such as arbitration or mediation. By
making these arguments in favor of intervention in combination with the
supporting case law, insurers have a legitimate chance of being allowed
to intervene so they may protect their interests in underlying tort litigation.
In addition, Colorado public policy concerning judicial economy
and settlement favors intervention. Courts that have recognized the right
of intervention by insurers in similar circumstances (i.e., involving Bashor/Nunn-like agreements) did so, in part, because intervention promotes judicial economy.35 Allowing an insurer to intervene so that the
30. Id. at 1333.
31. Id. at 1333–34.
32. Id. at 1334.
33. Anderson v. Martinez, 762 P.2d 645, 650 (Ariz. 1988).
34. H.B.H., 823 P.2d at 1338–39.
35. See Anderson, 762 P.2d at 650 (allowing an insurer to intervene and holding that, because
an insurance company must be given an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a Bashor/Nunntype settlement between a plaintiff and insured, including whether or not it was fraudulent or collusive, “it would serve the purpose of judicial economy to permit the insurer to take this opportunity
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issue of a judgment’s reasonableness is dealt with in a single proceeding
promotes judicial economy and similarly increases the likelihood that the
parties will, once intervention is allowed, attempt a global settlement of
the dispute. This saves judicial resources, time, and money for all parties
involved.
CONCLUSION
The Colorado Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of Bashor/Nunn agreements between insureds and third-parties, allowing the
insured to trade his own liability in exchange for his rights to sue an insurer. This leaves the insurer, which had no participation in the underlying lawsuit, stuck fighting against the stigma of the liability and/or damages determination from the previous suit in any subsequent bad faith
action. In states, such as Arizona, that have recognized agreements like
Colorado’s Bashor/Nunn agreements, insurers are regularly permitted to
intervene in an underlying tort suit where the damages component of the
insurer’s potential liability for later bad faith claims is being litigated.
Colorado law permitting an insurer’s intervention in underlying tort
litigation between a third-party and an insured is still unsettled and
evolving. Though intervention in this context is still a matter of first impression in Colorado, it is likely that insurers meet all Rule 24 intervention requirements and can successfully argue to be allowed to intervene
in underlying tort actions in order to promote public policy goals such as
fairness and judicial economy.

when all of the parties are involved and can present evidence to the court on the issue at one hearing”); H.B.H., 823 P.2d at 1337–38 (citing Anderson, 762 P.2d at 650) (finding error where trial
court failed to allow insurer to intervene).

